Automated insider threat detection system using user and role-based profile assessment by Buckley, Oliver et al.
IEEE SYSTEMS JOURNAL 1
Automated Insider Threat Detection System
using User and Role-based Profile Assessment
Philip A. Legg, Oliver Buckley, Michael Goldsmith and Sadie Creese
Abstract—Organisations are experiencing an ever-growing con-
cern of how to identify and defend against insider threats. Those
who have authorised access to sensitive organisational data are
placed in a position of power that could well be abused and could
cause significant damage to an organisation. This could range
from financial theft and intellectual property theft, through to
the destruction of property and business reputation. Traditional
intrusion detection systems are not designed, nor are capable,
of identifying those who act maliciously within an organisation.
In this paper, we describe an automated system that is capable
of detecting insider threats within an organisation. We define a
tree-structure profiling approach that incorporates the details of
activities conducted by each user and each job role, and then use
this to obtain a consistent representation of features that provide
a rich description of the user’s behaviour. Deviation can be
assessed based on the amount of variance that each user exhibits
across multiple attributes, compared against their peers. We
have performed experimentation using 10 synthetic data-driven
scenarios and found that the system can identify anomalous
behaviour that may be indicative of a potential threat. We also
show how our detection system can be combined with visual
analytics tools to support further investigation by an analyst.
Keywords—Insider threat, anomaly detection, cyber security.
I. INTRODUCTION
T he insider-threat problem is one that is constantly growingin magnitude, resulting in significant damage to organisa-
tions and businesses alike. Those who operate within an organ-
isation are often trusted with highly confidential information
such as intellectual property, financial records and customer
accounts, in order to perform their job. If an individual should
choose to abuse this trust and act maliciously towards the
organisation, then their position within the organisation, their
knowledge of the organisational systems, and their ability to
access such materials, means that they can pose a serious threat
to the operation of the business. The range of possible activities
could be anything from taking money from a cash register, to
exfiltrating intellectual property from the organisation to sell
on to rivals which could effectively destroy the successful oper-
ation of the organisation. Capelli et al. from the Carnegie Mel-
lon University Computer Emergency Response Team (CMU-
P. A. Legg was with the Cyber Security Centre, University of Oxford,
Oxford OX1 3QD, U.K. He is now with the Department of Computer
Science, University of the West of England, Bristol BS16 1QY, U.K. (e-mail:
phil.legg@uwe.ac.uk).
O. Buckley was with the Cyber Security Centre, University of Oxford,
Oxford OX1 3QD, U.K.. He is now with the Centre for Cyber Security and
Information Systems, Cranfield University, Cranfield MK43 0AL, U.K., and
also with Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Wiltshire SN6 8LA, U.K.
M. Goldsmith and S. Creese are with the Cyber Security Centre, University
of Oxford, Oxford OX1 3QD, U.K.
CERT) group identify three main groups of insider threat: IT
sabotage, theft of IP, and data fraud [1]. There are also a
growing number of cases that media attention has highlighted
in recent years that reveal both businesses and governments
alike have suffered similar experiences, whereby top secret
information has been exfiltrated and passed on to oppositions.
The threat posed by the insider is very real, and requires
serious attention from both employees and organisations alike.
Over the years, technological advancements have meant
that the way organisations conduct business is constantly
evolving. It is now common practice for employees to have
access to large repositories of organisation documents stored
electronically on distributed file servers. Many organisations
provide their employees with company laptops for working
whilst on the move, and use e-mail to organise and sched-
ule appointments. Services such as video conferencing are
frequently used for hosting meetings across the globe, and
employees are constantly connected to the Internet where they
can obtain information on practically anything that they require
for conducting their workload. Given the electronic nature of
organisational records, these technological advancements could
potentially make it easier for insiders to attack. From the
organisational view, one advantage to this is the capability of
capturing activity logs that may provide insight into the actions
of employees. However, actually analysing such activity logs
would be infeasible for any analyst due to the sheer volume
of activity being conducted by employees every day. What is
required is a capability to analyse individual users who conduct
business on organisational systems, to assess when users are
behaving normally, and when users are posing a threat.
In this work, we present a systematic approach for in-
sider threat detection and analysis based on the concept of
anomaly detection. Given a large collection of activity log
data, the system constructs tree-structured profiles that describe
individual user activity and combined role activity. Using
these profiles, comparisons can be clearly made to assess
how the current daily observations vary from previously-
observed activities. In this fashion, we construct a feature set
representation that describes the observations made for each
day, and the variations that are exhibited between the current
day and the previously-observed days. This large feature set
is reduced into multiple anomaly assessment scores using
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [2] decompositions on
subsets of features, to identify the degree of deviation for each
grouping. The anomaly assessment scores can be used either
with classification schemes to produce a list of suspicious
users, or can be visualized using parallel co-ordinates plots
to provide a more in-depth view. To test the performance
of the approach, a red team developed 10 simulated insider
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threat scenarios for experimentation that are designed to cover
a variety of different types of insider attacks that are often
observed. It was found that the system performed significantly
well for detecting the attacks using the classification alerts, and
the visualization enabled analysts to identify what particular
attributes caused the insider to be detected. The remainder
of the paper is as follows: Section II discusses the related
works. Section III describes the requirements of an insider
threat detection system. Section IV presents the proposed sys-
tem, describing in detail the different components. Section V
presents process of constructing effective simulation data and
the experimentation of the detection system, and Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
The topic of insider threat has recently received much
attention in the literature. Researchers have proposed a variety
of different models that are designed to prevent or detect
the presence of attacks (e.g., [3], [4]). Similarly, there is
much work that considers the psychological and behavioural
characteristics of insiders who may pose a threat as means
for detection (e.g., [5], [6], [7]). Kammu¨ller and Probst [8]
consider how organisations can identify attack vectors based on
policy violations, to minimise the potential of insider attacks.
Likewise, Ogiela and Ogiela [9] study how to prevent insider
threats using hierarchical and threshold secret sharing. For
the remainder of this section, we choose to focus particularly
on works that address the practicalities of designing and
developing systems that can predict or detect the presence of
insider threat.
Early work by Spitzner [10] discusses the use of honeypots
(decoy machines that may lure an attack) for detecting in-
sider attacks. However, as security awareness increases, those
choosing to commit insider attacks are finding more subtle
methods to cause harm or defraud their organisations, and so
there is a need for more sophisticated prevention and detection.
Early work by Magklaras and Furnell [11] considers how to
estimate the level of threat that is likely to originate from a
particular insider based on certain profiles of user behaviour.
As they acknowledge, substantial work is still required to
validate the proposed solutions. Myers et al. [12] consider how
web server log data can be used to identify malicious insiders
who look to exploit internal systems. Maloof and Stephens [13]
propose a detection tool for when insiders violate need-to-
know restrictions that are in place within the organisation.
Okolica et al. [14] use Probabilistic Latent Semantic Indexing
with Users to determine employee interests, which are used
to form social graphs that can highlight insiders. Liu et
al. [15] propose a multilevel framework called SIDD (Sensitive
Information Disseination Detection) that incorporates network-
level application identification, content signature generation
and detection, and covert communication detection.
More recently, Eldardiry et al. [16] also propose a system for
insider threat detection based on feature extraction from user
activities. However, they do not factor in role-based assess-
ment. In addition, the profiling stage that we perform allows
us to extract many more features beyond the activity counts
that they suggest. Brdiczka et al. [17] combine psychological
profiling with structural anomaly detection to develop an ar-
chitecture for insider-threat detection. They use data collected
from the multi-player online game, World of Warcraft, to pre-
dict whether a player will quit their guild. In contrast to real-
world insider threat detection, they acknowledge that the game
contains obvious malicious behaviours, however they aim to
apply these techniques to real-world enterprises. Eberle et
al. [18] consider Graph-Based Anomaly Detection as a tool for
detecting insiders, based on modifications, insertions and dele-
tions of activities from the graph. They use the Enron e-mail
dataset [19] and cell-phone traffic as two preliminary cases,
within the intention of extending to the CERT insider threat
datasets. Senator et al. [20] propose to combine structural and
semantic information on user behaviour to develop a real-world
detection system. They use a real corporate database, gather as
part of the Anomaly Detection at Multiple Scales (ADAMS)
program, however due to confidentiality they can not disclose
the full details and so it is difficult to compare against the work.
Parveen et al. [21] use stream mining and graph mining to
detect insider activity in large volumes of streaming data, based
on ensemble-based methods, unsupervised learning and graph-
based anomaly detection. Parveen and Thuraisingham [22]
extend the work with an incremental learning algorithm for
insider threat detection that is based on maintaining repetitive
sequences of events. They use trace files collected from real
users of the Unix C shell [23], however this public dataset is
relatively dated now.
One clear observation from these related works is that access
to real-world data is extremely difficult, and so researchers
synthesise data that is similar to that of a real-world enterprise,
or use a subset of data points, or apply insider threat detection
techniques to other problem domains (e.g., online games). In
our work, we particularly wanted to represent the variety and
volume of data that would be observed in a modern real-world
organisation, and show how this could be combined to form
an overall assessment for each user and for each role. We also
wanted to clearly demonstrate a wide variety of insider threat
scenarios as represented by our synthetic data generation, and
show how our detection system would be capable of detecting
the different attacks.
III. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
The work described in this paper was carried out as part
of a wider inter-disciplinary project that includes computer
scientists, security researchers, and cyber-psychology experts.
As the problem of insider threat continues to be of growing
concern to businesses and governments alike, there becomes a
critical need for practical tools to help alleviate the threat that
is posed. Our understanding of what we believe to constitute as
insider threat is the result of close inter-disciplinary collabora-
tion between industry, government and academia. The system
that is proposed here aims to address the majority of scenarios
that are understood from the knowledge that has been shared
by organisations experiencing such attacks, and case studies
that have been documented in research reports and the media.
Our initial work on insider threat detection was to develop a
conceptual model of how a detection system could connect the
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Fig. 1. Architecture of the insider threat detection system. The system comprises of a number of key components that process incoming log data records and
construct a profile of user and role behaviour for the current day, and assess the level of threat posed by the invididual. Alerts can be automatically triggered
at three levels: policy violations and previously-recognised attacks, threshold-based anomalies or deviation-based anomalies. Alerts are dealt with by an analyst
who can then determine whether the individual does actually pose a threat or not. If deemed not to be a threat, the analyst can refine the detection model to
minimise the false positive rate for future observations.
actions of the real world with the hypothesis that a particular
individual is an insider [3]. It is crucial that organisations
looking to deploy insider threat detection tools have a clear
understanding of the valuable assets of the organisation, and
the monitored activities that relate to these assets, to therefore
understand the type of attacks that could potentially arise. In
developing our conceptual model, we identified the different
elements that exist within organisations to understand what
elements could be affected as a result of an insider attack.
As a result, we can define the requirements of the detection
system as given below:
• The system should be able to determine a score for each
user that relates to the threat that they currently pose.
• The system should be able to deal with various forms of
insider threat, including sabotage, intellectual property
theft, and data fraud.
• The system should also be able to deal with unknown
cases of insider threat, whereby the threat is deemed to
be an anomaly for that user and for that role.
• The system should assess the threat that an individual
poses based on how this behaviour deviates from both
their own previous behaviour, and the behaviour exhib-
ited by those in a similar job role.
Whilst we aim for a well-defined detection system that can
alleviate the presence of insider threat, to promise a system
that can eradicate the problem is a bold claim that we do
not try to state here. By the very nature of an insider attack,
a sophisticated attacker would be conscious of covering their
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tracks to avoid being detected. For example, they could attempt
to falsify or delete the activity logs that are reported to the
detection system, or they could attempt to circumvent standard
monitoring practices. In theory, the very nature of modifying
or deleting log files should be detected and so should raise
an alert, given that this behaviour should not be deemed as
normal. Such attacks would therefore most likely be detected
through a combination of both online and offline behaviours,
such as acting suspiciously in the workplace.
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The architecture of the detection system is detailed in Fig-
ure 1. Here, the detection system connects with a database that
contains all available log records that exist for the organisation.
Such examples may be computer-based access logs, e-mail
and web records, and physical building access (e.g., swipe
card logs). All records for the current date are retrieved and
parsed by the system. For each record, the user ID is used to
append the activity to their daily observed profile. Likewise,
the activity is also appended to the daily observed profile of
their associated role, if applicable. Once the daily observation
profiles are constructed, the system proceeds to assess each
user based on three levels of alerts: policy violations and
previously-recognised attacks, threshold-based anomalies, and
deviation-based anomalies. At each stage in the assessment,
the system can trigger an alert to the analyst to notify of a
supposed threat being observed. The analyst can investigate
the alert, and then decide whether this alert is correct. Should
the analyst decide that the alert is not correct, then they have
the capability to reject a detection result which then refines the
parameters within the system, to minimise the false positive
rate for future observations.
In the following sections, we will detail how each of the key
components of the system are performed to identify at-risk in-
dividuals. We consider the key components of the system to be
the retrieval of records from the organisational database, user
and role-based profiling, profile feature extraction, anomaly
assessment from features, and classification of threat from
anomaly scores. For this work, a pilot detection system was de-
veloped using the Python programming language. In addition,
visualization components have also been developed that allow
the analyst to explore different components of the detection
process, such as user profiles and multiple anomaly scores.
Our visualization components are developed using a Python
back-end and the popular D3 javascript library for the front-
end display [24].
A. Data Input
At the first stage of the pipeline is the Data Parser Module
that interfaces with the organisation. For each day, the system
requests the set of records from the log data that correspond
with the current date. In theory, this could consist of many
different captures of data from different sensors within the
organisation. Our initial work was based on the datasets
provided by CMU-CERT. In these datasets, the organisation
activity logs consist of five different files that correspond to
the different activities that can be performed: login, usb device,
e-mail, web, and file access. Each record is parsed to obtain
a timestamp, a user ID, a device ID (i.e., what device logged
the action) and an activity name (e.g., login, e-mail). Some
activities (i.e., e-mails, files, websites) may also contain further
information that we assign as the attribute, such as the e-
mail recipients, the filename accessed, or the website accessed.
Where an attribute is provided, the system is also capable of
retrieving and analysing content that can be assigned as the
final property of the record, which is handled by the Content
Parser.
The Content Parser consists of two main techniques of
analysing textual data: bag of words, and Linguistic Inquiry
Word Count (LIWC) [25]. For analysing website and file
content, Content Parser will scrape the given URL and retrieve
all text that is recognised to exist within the English dictionary.
Using a bag of words approach to construct a feature set, this
feature vector is assigned to the given record. Similarly, for
e-mail content we construct a feature vector, however rather
than using the raw text content, we use features defined by
LIWC. The justification of this is three-fold. Firstly, given the
sensitivity of e-mail content, many organisations are concerned
with directly monitoring the content of e-mails. Secondly, the
LIWC categories have well-defined meaning with regards to
psychological context, and so could provide more meaningful
information regarding the e-mail content than the raw message
would do in any case. Finally, there are 80 features defined
by the LIWC tool, so it means that the size of the feature
vector can easily be reduced. It would be possible to use either
technique for assessment of each activity, however we make
this distinction due to e-mails being user-generated, rather than
websites or files that are only being read by a user. Each
content-based feature vector is combined with the user and
role-based daily observation profiles, which we will describe
further in Section IV-B.
The Content Parser serves as an optional module within our
architecture. It is understood that many organisations currently
do not maintain records of all content from e-mails being
sent, due to privacy concerns. However, organisations may
well change their position on this, especially if it is believed
that such content would help in combatting against the threat
of insider attacks. For the development of our system, we
have worked with a number of synthetic data sets including
CMU-CERT insider threat scenarios, the published Enron e-
mail dataset, sample data provided by CPNI (Centre for the
Protection of National Infrastructure), and in-house generated
data. One challenge with using synthetic datasets such as
CMU-CERT and our own, is that whilst the data may show
that e-mails were sent or files were accessed, since these are
purely synthetic there is no substantial content within the files
or e-mails. E-mail content may be a collection of randomly-
chosen words that define a topic, rather than a meaningful
communication sent by a human user. Whilst we have been
able to trial such methods on e-mail and web analysis in
isolation, without these pairing up with corresponding insider
threat scenarios it is difficult to truly validate the approach.
However, it is incorporated into the overall architecture since
it serves as an optional complimentary anomaly metric that
analysts can choose whether to utilise, based on the availability
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B. User and Role-based Profiling
The second stage of the system is user and role-based
profiling. Each user and each role that exists within the organ-
isation is defined by a tree-structured profile that describes the
different devices, activities, and attributes that they have been
observed on. This notion of a tree-structured profile provides a
consistent representation for all users, and for all roles that can
be used for comparative assessment, either between multiple
employees, or between multiple time steps for a particular
employee. Figure 2 illustrates the profile of a typical user using
our tree visualization tool. At the root of the tree is the user
ID (or in the case of a role tree, the role title), which can
consist of three child nodes: observations made for the current
date (daily), observations that have previously been made and
exist within the normal profile (normal), and if applicable,
observations that have been deemed to be suspicious (attack).
For each of these branches, we define the same hierarchical
structure to facilitate comparison. At the first level down, all
devices that the user has been observed on are given. In the
case of a role tree, this would be all devices observed by all
users who act within this particular role. These typically would
be computers, however this could well be extended to other
electronic devices such as printers or door locks. The next
level of the tree shows all the activities the user has performed
on each of these devices. The level below this then shows the
attributes, if applicable, such as the files or web sites accessed,
or the e-mail addresses that the user has contacted. Each node
in the profile maintains a 24-bin histogram that denotes the
hourly usage for that particular state, based on the observed
records. In addition, attributes can also maintain the results of
the Content Parser as a cumulative histogram.
For each record, the system first compares this record against
the state of the user’s current daily profile. If the device-
activity-attribute tuple does not exist within the tree-structured
profile, then a new node is created at the appropriate location
within the daily profile tree. The associated histogram for
the node is then updated based on the timestamp of the
observed record. Similarly, the tuple is also compared against
the corresponding role profile that the user belongs to. This
provides a profile that describes the currently daily activity
for all users and for all roles. If the user belongs to multiple
roles, then the system can be configured to either populate
all roles that the user belongs to, or to create a specific role
type that is then populated (e.g., technician-engineer could
define the set of users who act in both roles). Once all daily
records have been observed, the next stage of the system is
to derive a feature set that provides a comprehensive and
comparable description of each user’s profile. To do this, the
system compares the current daily profile against the existing
previous profile.
Once the daily observation profile is constructed, the system
can perform a comparison against organisational policies and
previously-recognised attack patterns. A rule-based approach
can be specified using a policy language, that can be used to
state how particular observations should be treated (e.g., all
logins out of hours should be flagged to the analyst with a
medium severity level). If there are no violations flagged up
at this stage then the system proceeds to the next level.
C. Feature Extraction
Once we have computed the current daily profile for each
user and for each role, we perform our feature extraction.
Since the profile structure is well-defined, it means that a wide
variety of comparisons between users, roles, or time steps can
be easily made. We define a series of features that consider
new observations across devices, activities, and attributes, for
the user compared against their previous behaviours, and for
the user compared against the previous behaviour of all users
within the same role (e.g., New device for user, New activity
for device for role, New activity for any device for user). We
also define a series of features that assess the hourly and daily
usage counts for each particular device, activity, and attribute
(e.g., Hourly usage count for device, Hourly usage count for
activity, Hourly usage count for attribute, Daily usage count
for activity). Finally, we define time-based features for each
particular device, activity, and attribute (e.g., Latest logon time
for user, Earliest USB time for user, USB duration for user).
The full feature matrix that we currently consider consists of
168 columns (the full list of extracted features is available
in [26]). The complete set of features allow for assessment
of three key areas: the user’s daily observations, comparisons
between the user’s daily activity and their previous activity, and
comparisons between the user’s daily activity and the previous
activity of their role.
D. Threat Assessment
Once the feature set for the current daily observation has
been computed, the next stage of the system is to determine
whether these features show significant deviation in behaviour
compared with all previously-accepted observations. To do
this, an n×m matrix is constructed for each user, where n is
the total number of sessions (or days) being considered, and
m is the number of features that have been obtained from the
profile. The bottom row of the matrix represents the current
daily observation, with the remainder of the matrix being
all previous observation features. To derive the amount of
variation that is exhibited in the multivariate feature space, we
perform PCA to obtain a projection of the features into lower
dimensional space based on the amount of variance exhibited
by each feature. What this means is that features that have
a higher variance can be projected into a lower-dimensional
space whilst preserving separability between similar and dis-
similar features. It is often used to enable visualization and
understanding of large datasets using only 2 or 3-dimensions,
to observe the clustering of similar data records. For our
application, we also allow a weight to be associated with
each feature so that features of greater importance can be
emphasised, as dictated by an analyst. In this way, the analyst
can generate different models for analysis based on different
configurations of weighted combinations. If no weights are
specified then the weight is taken to be 1/f where f is the
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Fig. 2. Tree-structured profiles of user and role behaviours. The profile shows all the devices, activities, and attributes that the user has been observed performing.
The probability distribution for normal hourly usage is given in the top-right, and the distribution for the detected attack is given in the bottom-right. Here it
can be seen that the user has accessed resources late at night.
total number of features. All feature columns are normalized
before the PCA decomposition is performed. By default, we
consider a decomposition of the features to a 2-dimensional
space. If all feature observations were identical, then all points
in the new space would be clustered at the origin. However,
given the deviation that is expected of human behaviour, points
are likely to be clustered near to, but not directly at, the centre.
For the new matrix, we consider only the current observation,
which is the bottom-most record in the matrix. We compute the
distance of this point from the origin in the new space, and take
this to be the anomaly score of this metric at this observation.
This process is performed for each of the anomaly metrics,
where each metric consists of a subset of the overall feature set,
and if specified, a corresponding weighting function for each
feature. Each anomaly metric can be configured to alert if the
score obtained for that particular metric is above a particular
threshold.
The anomaly metrics that are currently considered include:
Login anomaly, Login duration anomaly , Logoff anomaly
, USB inserstion anomaly , USB duration anomaly ,
Email anomaly , Web anomaly , File anomaly , This anomaly
, Any anomaly , New anomaly , Hourly anomaly ,
Number anomaly , User anomaly , Role anomaly , and,
Total anomaly. The system could easily support the addition
of further anomaly metrics, based on the observation of
different activity types. From our researching into case studies
of insider threat, most cases could be associated with either
performing a new activity, performing an existing activity
at a new time of day, or performing an existing activity
more or less often than previously. These define our ‘new’,
‘hourly’, and ‘number’ metrics. The combination of multiple
metrics also provide support for greater confidence in the
result obtained regarding an individual. For example, we may
observe that a particular individual scores higher than other
users not only on ‘hourly anomaly’ or ‘total anomaly’, but
also on ‘file anomaly’ and ‘email anomaly’. By considering
how the different subsets of features score, rather than a
single overall score, it allows an assessment to be made on
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# # users # records # days Malicious
modified activities
1 100 2486663 4 (20 file, 4 email)
2 305 8452267 5 (34 file, 5 http)
3 12 115745 10 (34 file, 20 usb, 10 login)
4 50 905053 5 (10 login, 9 http)
5 200 2692373 1 (200 email)
6 100 2514792 2 (2 file, 1 login, 2 usb, 4 email)
7 305 8458402 2 (3 file, 6 email)
8 12 117195 10 (10 login, 24 file)
9 50 893700 4 (6 login, 1 file, 2 usb)
10 200 2697772 1 (2 http, 1 file)
TABLE I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 10 INSIDER THREAT SCENARIOS,
INCLUDING THE VOLUME AND TYPE OF INSERTED MALICIOUS ACTIVITY.
EACH SCENARIO CONSISTS OF 365 DAYS OF ACTIVITY LOGS.
not only that an individual is posing as a threat, but also on
what attack vectors they are acting on. Here, we observe that
the user is logging in at an unusual time to access new files
and e-mail new contacts.
E. Classification of threat
The final stage of the system is to provide assessment of
the threat that is posed by an individual, given the observa-
tion of their activity, and the collection of anomaly scores
that have been assigned to their daily observation profile.
One approach to this as a relatively effective measure is to
simply normalise each column of the anomaly score matrix,
and then take the maximum standard deviation as a integer
classification of importance. We would expect most data to
exist within 2 standard deviations of the norm, so anything
above this should certainly be investigated. Likewise, we can
also compute the mahalanobis distance to assess how far
away an individual’s observation are from the rest of the
distribution. As a third approach that can be deployed, we
compute the covariance matrix of a user’s anomaly scores,
and on each daily observation assess the signed differences
between the covariances. The system could well be extended
to support other classification schemes in the future as desired
by the analyst. The classification can be used flag up users
to the analyst, and also to determine whether a user’s daily
observation profile should be included within their previously-
observed normal profile. If the observation is deemed to be
too much of an anomaly, then the observation is recorded as
an attack rather than their normal. This is a vital stage so as
to not contaminate a user’s previously-observed profile with
malicious behaviour, whilst also providing the capability for
each daily observation to contribute towards the previously-
observed profile.
V. EXPERIMENTATION
To be able to assess the performance of the detection system,
we conduct a series of experimentation scenarios using the
prototype system. As part of the wider project on insider threat,
10 scenarios have been developed that cover the broad range
of possible attacks that an insider could perform against their
organisation. For each scenario, a narrative has been devised
that explains what has happened, including why the individual
has chosen to act against the organisation, and what they have
done. Each scenario is modelled within a unique synthetically-
generated dataset that represents the normal activity of the
organisation. The data contains all employee activity within
the organisation for the period of 365 days, including that of
the insider. We consider the first 15 days as training data, where
no attacks are initiated, so that an initial normal baseline can
be obtained. The remaining 350 days are then used as testing,
whereby each newly-observed day that is deemed to be normal
then contributes towards the normal baseline. The scenarios
were developed in isolation of the detection system, so not to
have been bias by this, and have been designed to test a variety
of different scenarios that could occur over different attack
vectors. In addition to our own synthetic data, we have also
used third-party datasets generated by CMU-CERT to further
validate the performance of the approach described.
A. Constructing experimentation data
The creation of the synthetic datasets was conducted in
isolation of the detection system so as to not introduce any
bias. The premise of the activity was to craft a synthetic
organisation for each scenario, and insert a malicious employee
in such a way that their behaviours correspond with those
that have been documented by the various case studies of
previously-observed attacks. All the while, the intent was
to create different scenarios with the objective of beating
the detection system, within the confines of the data points
available as described in Section IV-A.
The approach used to generate the data sets involved an
automated system to generate the normal day-to-day activity
(the background noise) and then the attack data was manually
injected into the log files. The method used to create the
normal activity has focused on the notion of defining a ‘virtual
organisation’. In our system an organisation is composed of a
number of staff roles (e.g. manager, developer), with a number
of employees in each of the roles.
The employees role is used as the seed for the data
generation process and determines the boundaries of normal
behaviour of an employee undertaking that role. An em-
ployee’s role, within our virtual organisation, defines the nor-
mal boundaries of behaviour over a number of data dimensions
including: log-in times, USB device insertions, HTTP requests,
email contacts, emails sent and file system accesses. The role
does not provide entirely uniform behaviour; there are only
average values for an employee in that role. For example, an
employee in an administrative role may typically log-in to the
system between 8am and 10am and log-out between 4pm and
6pm. The data generation system would, typically, assign the
employee a log-in time within the specified window but there
is also the provision to generate occasional, anomalous values
outside of this window.
Once the normal activity has been generated, then the
malicious activity is manually inserted into the datasets. For
each of the attacks inserted an attack scenario was written,
specifying the type of employee (i.e. the employee’s role) and
describing the nature of the attack. For example, a scenario
may specify that a manager, within the organisation, had
been arriving at work earlier than they normally would and
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# L2 alerts L2 alerts L2 alerts L3 alerts L3 alerts L2 anomaly vectors L3 anomaly vectors
(σ > 0.1) (σ > 0.2) (σ > 0.3) (σ = 1.0) (σ = 2.0)
1 935 415 352 276 75 n/a n/a
2 3033 1481 1259 964 293 n/a n/a
3 145 92 88 63 24 logon, logon duration insert, file, hourly, user, total
4 373 120 83 68 14 logoff, user, role, number, new logon, logon duration, total
5 1573 553 474 391 82 user, this new, email
6 906 394 340 287 52 user, new, this n/a
7 3068 1462 1254 977 276 n/a user, file
8 160 94 90 64 25 logon, logon duration user, file, total
9 358 125 89 68 20 logon, logon duration n/a
10 1645 610 526 452 73 n/a new, number, user, role, hourly, total
TABLE II. RESULTS FROM 10 INSIDER THREAT SCENARIOS FOR LEVEL 2 AND LEVEL 3 ALERTS.
browsing to new areas of the corporate network that they
had not previously visited. Once a scenario is created then
an employee in the correct role is selected and the attack data
is inserted into the log files. Owing to the random nature of
the data generation process very little was known about the
behaviour of the ‘malicious’ employee prior to the insertion
of the attack data. The data inserted, about an attack, relates
directly to the employee’s behaviour, rather than that of the
role. If we consider the earlier example of a manager who
begins to log-in earlier than before, and accesses new areas of
the corporate network then the earlier log-ins would early for
that particular employee, not the role as a whole. This makes
the attack insertion slightly more subtle and harder to identify.
Details of each synthetic dataset are provided in Table I.
B. Results
Table II shows the results from the detection system. We
show the number of alerts that are generated under different
operational schemes for Level 2 and Level 3 alerts. In addition,
we show the anomaly metrics that the alerts were triggered for.
In this experiment, it is clear that L3 alerts with a deviation
of σ = 2.0 gave the fewest alerts. In real-world operation,
it may well be beneficial to preserve alerts generated under
different operational schemes, for instance, to observe that
an employee is consistently scoring just below a particular
threshold. This knowledge, coupled with offline behaviours,
could well reveal the employee to be a threat, which would
have been missed otherwise. From these results, the best
result is obtained from scenario 3. Here, there are 4200 daily
assessments made (12 employees for 350 days), of which 24
are flagged as anomalies. From Table I, we see that 10 of the
days consisted of malicious activity, of which all 10 days are
within the set of 24 detected anomalies. Based on precision
and recall, this gives a precision of 42% and a recall of 100%.
Whilst it is clear that the system still presents some error, the
effort of an analyst to investigate 24 results rather than 4200 is
still clearly advantageous. The classification of either being an
insider threat or not is somewhat of an ambiguous task, since it
is highly dependent on context, and it also involves the analyst
or managers to determine what the next course of action should
be regarding the individual. What is perhaps most important
from any insider threat detection system is that recall is ensured
over precision. In this sense, the detection system serves as a
means to filter a substantial number of assessments to alleviate
the efforts of the analyst.
Futhermore, we also present our results using a parallel
co-ordinates plot that shows each of the anomaly metrics
as an individual axis (as shown in Figure 3). This example
is shown for a scenario generated by CMU-CERT, where
the dataset consists of 1000 employees, of which 1 is an
insider. Figure 3(a) shows 691000 daily observations on the
plot, and yet there is a distinct polyline which is seen to
be an outlier on multiple axes. By brushing the axis, as
shown in Figure 3(b), the analyst can filter the data and reveal
information on this particular case. Here, there are now only 4
observations, all of which are the actions of the inserted insider
who copied data to a USB drive during unusual work hours. By
coupling the detection results with a visual analytics approach,
this empowers the analyst much more to be able to identify
anomalous behaviour within the daily observation records.
In our experimentation, we found that 7 of the 10 cases
were clearly identifiable when using the parallel coordinates
plot. Of the cases that did failed, there are a number of factors
that could impact on the performance of the system. Firstly,
one of the scenarios that failed was dependent on the content
of a website, rather than the unusual access of it. Whilst
the architecture of the system supports content, we did not
include this in for the synthetic experimentation as the website
addresses were randomly created and so access to these would
not be feasible. Secondly, despite the synthetic data being
modelled to reflect human behaviour, it is difficult to truly
capture the intentions and motivations of the employees who
are supposedly acting normally. Therefore, there is possibility
that the normal background data exhibits noise and randomness
that real data should not have. Having said this, it is also
possible that the opposite could be true for some organisations,
and that in fact the synthetic data is too simple and not truly
reflecting the dynamic nature of real human behaviour. Never-
theless, we believe that the results presented here, for threshold
and deviation-based assessment, and for visual assessment of
anomalies, are encouraging for our initial experimentation. We
are currently working with a large international corporation to
deploy our experimentation system within their environment
to test our system against real-world activity data.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have presented an effective approach for
insider threat detection. From the organisational log data, the
system generates user and role-based profiles that can describe
the full extent of activities that users perform within the
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Fig. 3. Parallel coordinates plot of the multiple anomaly results that are
generated by the detection process. (a) Plot shows 691000 results for a year and
a half of monitoring 1000 employees. It can be seen that there exists a record
that can be described as an outlier over at least four of the different metrics.
(b) Plot shows 4 results that have been highlighted by the any anomaly metric
that all correspond to a particular individual. In this example, this invididual
was the inserted malicious insider who began using a USB device to copy
sensitive records earlier than they would normally act.
organisation. The tree-structured profiles are designed to be
easily comparable against other users, role types, and tem-
poral observations. From each daily observation, the system
constructs a large set of features that describe the state of
the current daily profile, and the previously observed profiles
for all users. The system then creates subsets of the features
that describe particular anomalies of interest, and computes a
PCA decomposition on this to identify features that exhibit
high deviation. Alerts are generated when anomaly scores are
deemed to be over a particular threshold, measured as the
standard deviation from the normalized anomaly scores. From
an alert, the analyst can visualize how the user differs from
their normal behaviour, or from other users, using a range
of visualization techniques. We demonstrate this approach for
a variety of synthetically-generated insider threat scenarios,
both from our own development and from CMU-CERT, and
find that the system performs well for identifying these attacks
across the range of anomaly metrics that are considered.
Clearly, by the very nature of an insider threat, the individual
in question is purposely attempting to stay below the radar, and
so to guarantee 100% detection success is difficult since there
could be a number of attacks that are not considered by the
designers of the detection system. Our future work is to explore
the notion of model evolution, and how multiple detection
models could operate in parallel. In our current architecture,
we have shown the process of refining the current model,
but what if the analyst chose to maintain both models and
compare the two? The analyst would then need to be able to
assess the performance of each model over time, to decide
whether it is worth utilising all models, or whether some
models should be discarded. There are also organisational-
dependant characteristics that may need to be considered,
however the approach described is designed to be flexible
to the forms of data that different organisations may collect.
We are currently conducting experiments with a large real-
world organisation to see how effective the tools can be
when studying real users, and in particular, the differences
between real normal and real threats. We are also exploring
whether decomposition to different levels of dimensionality
can improve the precision results for the detection system, to
further alleviate analyst efforts. What is very clear however, is
that organisations recognise that a real threats exist, and that
such systems as this could well detect and alleviate the efforts
that are required of organisational security analysts.
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